4:38pm

Fri April 1, 2011
Mine Safety In America

Emergency Reports Detail Slow Mine Blast Response

Part 1 of a two-part series

Nearly one year after the nation's worst mine disaster in four decades, records reveal a slow and tepid initial response to the dire emergency at Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch coal mine in West Virginia.

Twenty-nine mineworkers died on April 5, 2010, as a fierce explosion ripped through underground entryways, turning corners and splitting like a "T." The blast stretched two miles in one direction and three miles in the other, toward the entrance to the mine.

"I was about 300 feet [inside the mine]," recalls Stanley "Goose" Stewart, during a gathering at the National Consumers League last week. On the day of the blast, he was headed in for his shift in a mantrip, or shuttle car. "And I saw a bright light. Brightest light I ever saw."

The emergency response that followed is documented in nearly 20 hours of recorded emergency radio traffic and phone calls, as well as printed 911 logs and transcripts, and notes from the command center at the mine — all obtained by NPR through government open records requests.

The recordings and documents suggest two failures in Massey Energy's response, according to Davitt McAteer, a former federal mine safety chief who is leading an independent investigation of the Upper Big Branch disaster.

"One is timely reporting of an extremely serious situation. And second is the accuracy of that initial report, which underplayed the circumstances of what was going on."

McAteer has gathered and reviewed many of the same recordings and documents as part of his investigation.

The First Emergency Call

The initial report of a problem was phoned in to West Virginia's Mine Industrial Rapid Response hotline at 3:27 p.m.

"I want to report an emergency," says Jonah Bowles, safety director at Massey Energy's Marfork Coal Co. There is no sense of urgency as the hotline operator slowly takes down a name, phone number, name of the mine, location of the mine and more, often asking for spellings as the call lumbers along.

Bowles is asked what time the incident occurred. "It was reported at 3:27," he replies. But that's 25 minutes after the official time of the blast, which is 3:02 p.m., according to the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration.

Bowles is kept on the line for nearly a minute and a half before the call gets to the point.

"It is an air reversal on the beltline and CO [carbon monoxide] 50 to 100 parts per million," Bowles reports calmly. Two minutes into the call the hotline operator asks, "Anybody injured?"

"No," Bowles replies. "The mine is being evacuated at this time."

After another minute and a half, the call ends with a cheery, "You have a nice day" from the hotline operator.

Bowles then phoned an MSHA emergency hotline with the same information.

Details Of The Blast

"Air reversal on the beltline" doesn't sound as dramatic as what actually had happened at the mine.

"It became like a hurricane [with] debris blowing," says Stewart, who was about three miles from the ignition point of the blast. "We stumbled out, turned and looked and there was buckets and what have you flying out of the portal. ... Before I made it out I felt like my feet were going to leave the ground like I might go airborne."

Other witnesses reported the reversal of a massive mine fan, which blows fresh air into the mine. "To the people on the scene," says attorney Mark Moreland, this "was a very strong indication that something disastrous had happened inside the mine."

Moreland is privy to some aspects of the disaster investigation because he and his wife, Rachel, represent the interests of miners in the probe. The Morelands also represent some victims' families who are suing Massey Energy for wrongful death.

Bowles' carbon monoxide report was also an indication of serious trouble. Fifty to 100 parts per million of the gas mean "they've got a fire somewhere," says Robert Ferriter, a mine safety expert at the Colorado School of Mines. "A methane gas explosion could have also produced that much carbon monoxide."

Massey Vice President and General Counsel Shane Harvey told the Charleston Gazette in September that carbon monoxide alarms at the mine went off at 3:08 p.m.

The 911 Records

State and federal regulations require mine accident reporting within 15 minutes, a requirement Massey failed to meet. State and federal agencies respond by mobilizing mine rescue teams and other emergency resources.

"We have learned over the years that tardy notification or late notification is an impediment to efficient mine rescue," says McAteer.

Harvey says in a written statement that Massey initially reported "possible serious problem[s]. ... However, it wasn't until later that anyone understood that an explosion (which must be reported within 15 minutes) had occurred."

Actually, federal regulations are clear. "Any accident" must be reported within 15 minutes. And the kind of carbon monoxide inundation reported by Massey is specifically listed in the applicable regulation as a reportable "accident."

The recordings and records obtained by NPR also show that Massey's call to 911 wasn't placed until 4:22 p.m., nearly 90 minutes after the explosion and almost an hour after the initial report to the state and MSHA.

The 911 center in Raleigh County, W.Va., describes the call in its "incident detail" logs. The agency refused to provide NPR its 911 recordings, citing ongoing civil and criminal investigations.

"Possible 10 injured," the notes say. "Unsure of cause of injury. Advised subjects are still underground. Starting rescue effort at this time."

The Raleigh County dispatcher immediately calls in units from Whitesville in neighboring Boone County, which is close to the mine. The Boone County Emergency Management Agency provided recordings of its emergency radio traffic.

"Got a possible roof cave-in," the dispatcher calls out. "Possible 10 people inside. Needs units to respond to Performance Coal," the Massey subsidiary that operates Upper Big Branch.

Ambulances, EMTs and sheriff's deputies arrive at the mine just in time. Within five minutes, David Hodges, the assistant fire chief in Whitesville and the incident commander at the scene, reports, "I've got some patients surfacing. Looks like I've got numerous unresponsive." Stewart is among the nine miners that are brought out. Seven are dead or dying. Two are injured, one seriously. Stewart says he tries to help.

"It felt like a combat zone. Your dead buddies are laying all around you," he recalls.

Stewart and other miners laid out blankets so the bodies of their friends wouldn't rest on gravel. As a measure of respect and dignity, Stewart lifted the arms of one colleague and laid them across his chest.

"After that," Stewart said, "I walked over and sat down and I just cried."

"They're still bringing fellows to the surface," Hodges reports, sounding increasingly alarmed. "It's a total disaster. ... I need all the resources you can get me."

Time Needed To Get Underground

Greg Lay, the emergency management director in Boone County, is disturbed but not surprised by what he considers Massey's delayed call for emergency help.

"We have mines around here that are very cooperative and we have mines that are pretty tight-lipped," Lay says, noting he has more than 80 mining operations in his county. "I would have to say that Massey has a history, with my experience, to be pretty tight-lipped when it comes to just anybody being on their property at all," including emergency medical personnel.

Massey's Harvey did not respond to a question about this alleged late reporting of emergencies. But Harvey rejects the notion that the 911 call was late.

"It took a significant amount of time to enter the mine and determine that emergency responders were needed," Harvey says. The first injured miner was encountered approximately 1.6 miles underground."

Lay notes that even if emergency crews arrived earlier, they would have waited on the surface for victims.

"It's a whole other world when it comes to doing rescue underground," Lay says. "We do not go underground."

That work is reserved for specially trained mine rescuers. And it appears Massey began deploying two of its mine rescue teams as early as 3:30 p.m., a half-hour after the blast. Eight Massey managers and miners also rushed in on their own and found the injured and dying miners before mine rescuers arrived. Both Lay and McAteer conclude an earlier 911 call would not have likely made a difference in the survival of victims. They would not have been treated or transported any sooner.

McAteer is still concerned because the timing may not be advantageous next time.

"Tardy reporting is an impediment to efficient mine rescue," McAteer says. "We need to have these things done and we need to have them done in a real time."

McAteer adds he'll have more about why these delays occurred in his final report on the disaster. No date has been set for its release.

NPR's Nathan Rott contributed to this report. Copyright 2011 National Public Radio. To see more, visit http://www.npr.org/.

Transcript

MICHELE NORRIS, host:

From NPR News, this is ALL THINGS CONSIDERED. I'm Michele Norris.

MELISSA BLOCK, host:

And I'm Melissa Block.

An NPR News investigation has turned up new details about the emergency response last year to the deadly coal mine disaster in West Virginia. One year ago, Tuesday, 29 workers died at Massey Energy's Upper Big Branch Mine.

Records reviewed by NPR's Howard Berkes indicate Massey's initial reporting of the mine disaster was slow and tepid.

HOWARD BERKES: Shortly after 3 p.m. last April 5th, a fierce explosion ripped through the Upper Big Branch Mine, turning corners underground and splitting like a T. It roared 2 miles in one direction and 3 miles in the other toward the mine entrance where Stanley "Goose" Stewart was heading in for his shift.

Mr. STANLEY "GOOSE" STEWART: We went underground. I was about 300 feet, luckily. And I was sitting in the mantrip, and I saw a bright light. Brightest light I ever saw.

BERKES: Stewart described his escape from the mine at a gathering at the National Consumers League.

Mr. STEWART: We took off. Hadn't went very far and it became like a hurricane - debris blowing. You got to remember, we were probably 3 miles at least from the point of the explosion. We stumbled out, turned and looked, and there was buckets and what have you flying out the portal. You could see the whoosh of the air.

Before I made it out, I felt like my feet were going to leave the ground, like I might go airborne.

Mr. MARK MORELAND (Lawyer): It was very obvious to anybody that was at the portal that something disastrous had occurred inside.

BERKES: Mark Moreland is an attorney who represents coal miners in the mine disaster investigation. He also represents victims' families suing Massey Energy.

Mr. MORELAND: The mine fan, which is a huge piece of equipment powered by huge electrical motors, had actually reversed, which, to the people on the scene at the time, was a very strong indication that something disastrous had happened inside the mine.

BERKES: But Massey Energy's first report of a problem wasn't phoned in for 25 minutes.

(Soundbite of phone ringing)

Unidentified Man #1: Mine Industrial Rapid Response line. May I help you?

Unidentified Man #2: Yes, I want to report an emergency.

BERKES: And there seemed little sense of urgency.

Unidentified Man #1: What county?

Unidentified Man #2: Raleigh.

(Soundbite of static)

Unidentified Man #1: What mine?

Unidentified Man #2: It is the Upper Big Branch South Mine.

BERKES: And it takes nearly a minute and a half to get to the point.

Unidentified Man #2: It is an air reversal on the belt lines and CO, 50 to 100 parts per million CO on it.

BERKES: That much carbon monoxide indicates a serious fire or explosion, according to Bob Ferriter at the Colorado School of Mines, but it takes two minutes to get to this.

Unidentified Man #1: And anybody injured?

Unidentified Man #2: No, the mine is being evacuated at this time.

BERKES: And after another minute and a half, the call ends.

Unidentified Man #1: Okay. Thank you, sir. You have a great day.

Unidentified Man #2: You do the same.

BERKES: This is just the first step in mine accident reporting, calls to both state and federal mine safety agencies. And they must be made within 15 minutes because they trigger the state and federal emergency response, including the deployment of mine rescue teams. That requirement followed the Sago Mine disaster five years ago, in which 12 miners died waiting rescue after delays in the reporting of the accident.

These calls were delayed but not nearly as much as the Massey Energy call to 911, which prompted this dispatch.

(Soundbite of a 911 call)

Unidentified Woman #1: Got a possible roof cave-in. Possible 10 people inside. Need units to respond to Performance Coal. But...

BERKES: This is nearly an hour and a half after the explosion, and an hour after Massey's first call to state and federal agencies. Calling 911 is the company's responsibility. And it's only that call that gets ambulances, EMTs and police to the scene. They got there just in time, just five minutes before the first dead and dying victims were carried out of the mine, according to emergency response records and recordings obtained by NPR.

Stanley Stewart was there trying to help.

Mr. STEWART: It felt like a combat zone. Your dead buddies laying all around you. After it was determined they were no longer alive, I said, lay a blanket down. We're not laying them on these gravels. Then when we'd lay one down, I put their hands up. I wasn't going to leave them laying like that. You got to have some respect. After that, I walked over and sat down, and I just cried.

BERKES: All this suggests two failures in the emergency response, says Davitt McAteer, who leads an independent investigation of the Upper Big Branch explosion.

Mr. DAVITT McATEER: One is the timely reporting of an extremely serious situation, and the second is the accuracy of that initial report which underplayed the circumstances of what was going on.

BERKES: And that doesn't surprise Greg Lay, the emergency management director in Boone County, West Virginia, which provided the initial emergency responders. Lay has more than 80 mining operations in his county and is familiar with calls from those owned by Massey Energy.

Mr. GREG LAY (Emergency Management Director, Boone County, West Virginia): We have mines around here that are very cooperative, and we have mines that are pretty tight-lipped.

BERKES: And Massey?

Mr. LAY: I would have to say Massey has a history, with my experience, to be pretty tight-lipped when it comes to just anybody being on their property at all.

BERKES: You mean including emergency medical personnel?

Mr. LAY: Yes. Yes.

BERKES: Massey Energy had no comment about this alleged late reporting of emergencies. But it says in a written statement that the 911 call took so long because the injured miners were 1.6 miles inside the mine. It took time to find them and get them out. Massey says its earlier calls to state and federal agencies were not late, because it took time to realize an explosion had occurred.

But federal mine safety regulations are clear: Any accident must be reported within 15 minutes, and an inundation of carbon monoxide is listed as a reportable accident.

Boone County's Greg Lay notes that even if emergency crews arrived earlier, they would have waited on the surface for victims.

Mr. LAY: It's entirely a different operation. It's a whole other world when it comes to doing rescue underground. We do not go underground.

BERKES: Only mine rescue teams do that. And it appears Massey began deploying two of if its mine rescue teams as early as 3:30, a half hour after the blast. Eight Massey managers and miners also rushed in on their own and found the injured and dying miners.

So both Lay and McAteer conclude that an earlier 911 call would not have likely made a difference in the survival of victims. They would not have been treated and transported any sooner, at least this time. McAteer is still concerned because there could be a next time.

Mr. McATEER: Tardy notification is an impediment to efficient mine rescue. We need to have these things done, and we need to have them done in real time.

BERKES: And McAteer says he'll have more about why these delays occurred in his final report on the Upper Big Branch disaster. There's no date yet for its release.

Unidentified Man #3: We're still trying to get all the total number, and they're still bringing fellows to the surface. It's just - it's a total disaster, Control. I need all the resources you can get me.

Unidentified Woman #2: Copy.

BERKES: It's now 5 o'clock, two hours after the explosion. Ambulances stream and scream along the twisting two-lane road in the Coal River Valley. Seven families receive heartbreaking news that night. Twenty-two others begin a painful and frustrating four-day vigil as mine rescuers try to find missing miners. They too encountered delayed reporting and incomplete information.

We'll have more on that Monday on NPR's MORNING EDITION.

Howard Berkes, NPR News.

BLOCK: At our website, you can see a timeline of the events of last April 5th. You can also find all the stories from NPR's yearlong investigation of the Upper Big Branch Mine disaster. Those are at npr.org.

(Soundbite of music) Transcript provided by NPR, Copyright National Public Radio.